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Abstract: We present a polarimetric-based optical encoder for image 
encryption and verification. A system for generating random polarized 
vector keys based on a Mach-Zehnder configuration combined with 
translucent liquid crystal displays in each path of the interferometer is 
developed. Polarization information of the encrypted signal is retrieved by 
taking advantage of the information provided by the Stokes parameters. 
Moreover, photon-counting model is used in the encryption process which 
provides data sparseness and nonlinear transformation to enhance security. 
An authorized user with access to the polarization keys and the optical 
design variables can retrieve and validate the photon-counting plain-text. 
Optical experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the encryption 
method. 
©2015 Optical Society of America 
OCIS codes: (060.4785) Optical security and encryption; (260.5430) Polarization; (030.5260) 
Photon counting. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, optical security and encryption methods [1–16] have attracted the interest of 
many authors. In particular, double random phase-masks encryption (DRPE) is an effective 
method which is very suitable for encoding images that can be easily implemented in practice 
using a 4f system [3–8]. By means of this technique it is possible to encrypt a signal in such a 
way that becomes very difficult to be retrieved by an unauthorized user. Only those who have 
access to the phase mask in the Fourier plane can access the original signal. There are many 
variations of this technique which have been introduced by various authors some of which are 
#226097 - $15.00 USD Received 31 Oct 2014; revised 15 Dec 2014; accepted 16 Dec 2014; published 12 Jan 2015 
(C) 2015 OSA 26 Jan 2015 | Vol. 23, No. 2 | DOI:10.1364/OE.23.000655 | OPTICS EXPRESS 656 
listed in [1–22]. Some authors have pointed out vulnerabilities of DRPE when facing 
specifically designed attacks [9–13], but security can be enhanced by increasing the number 
of degrees of freedom of this approach; for instance, changing the position of the phase masks 
in the optical setup [13,14]. Also, using randomized lens-phase functions can improve 
resistance against attack [15]. Another alternative is to use key masks that change the 
polarization direction and the phase difference between the electric field components [16–18]. 
Polarization has also been suggested as a method for extracting information from a scene 
[23]. Other methods to improve security have been proposed such as cryptographic blocks 
[19], a combination of real and virtual optics methods [20–22] or recording the encrypted 
distribution in low illumination conditions [24] using photon counting. Recording photon 
starved distributions is a highly nonlinear process in which only a few pixels of the encoded 
signal are recorded so that the corresponding decrypted image becomes very sparse and it 
does not reveal the original content. However, this distribution contains enough information 
to enable its validation when compared with the original image [24]. 
Interest in beams with non-uniform polarization patterns has increased significantly due to 
their special properties compared to homogeneously polarized beams, which can enhance the 
functionality of optical systems [25]. In particular, several methods based on interferometric 
configurations and liquid crystal displays have been suggested [26–31]. Recently, we reported 
a method for generating beams with arbitrary polarization based on a Mach-Zehnder setup 
combined with a translucent SLM in each path of the interferometer. The transverse 
components of the incident light beam are processed independently and modified by means of 
specifically designed holograms, recombined and imaged on a CCD camera. Our approach 
allows us to encode any polarization state at each point of the wave-front and the amplitude 
may also be modeled so as to obtain a particular shape in a given plane [32,33]. 
Random polarization distributions can be understood as encryption keys. In this paper, we 
describe an optical encryption processor based on a non-uniform arbitrary polarization setup. 
Moreover, security can be enhanced by recording the encrypted polarized signal under low-
light illumination conditions using the photon-counting model. Our objective is to develop a 
Fresnel-like polarization encoder able to encrypt signals taking advantage of the information 
provided by the Stokes parameters. The encryption system is optically implemented whereas 
the decryption procedure is carried out numerically. The experiment demonstrates the 
feasibility of using this system as a polarimetric photon counting optical encoder for security 
applications. 
Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we describe the optical setup 
for generating wave-fronts with arbitrary polarization states and how this system can be used 
for optical encryption proposes. In section 3 we illustrate the proposed procedure by means of 
a set of numerical calculations whereas an experimental implementation of the system is 
presented in section 4. Finally, the main conclusions are summarized in section 5. 
2. Polarization-based setup for optical encryption 
The proposed system is based on a Mach-Zehnder setup as depicted in Fig. 1. A collimated, 
linearly polarized beam at 45° of the x-direction is split into two beams by means of 
polarizing beam splitter PBS1. The plain-text real-valued image t is set in one of the arms of 
the interferometer at a distant d1 from spatial light modulator SLM1. In order to improve the 
encryption capabilities of the system, plain-text t is encoded by means of phase only mask 
M0. Modulator SLM1 is located at the front focal plane of lens L1; two wave plates (λ/2 and λ/4, respectively labelled HWP and QWP in Fig. 1) are placed before SLM1 as to obtain the 
expected modulation curve. Amplitude-only random encryption key M1 is displayed on this 
modulator. Note that this part of the optical system is equivalent to a lens-less Fresnel 
encryption processor [13]. 
A second modulator (SLM2) is placed in the other arm of the interferometer, displaying a 
phase-only distribution M2. SLM2 is placed at the front focal plane of lens L1 as well. A 
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neutral density filter controls the amount of light reaching this modulator. The information 
propagated through the two arms of the interferometer is recombined by means of PBS2. 
Since the modulators used are pixelated displays, a spatial filter is used for removing high 
order diffracted terms. Then, the light passes through a 4f imaging system; note that f1 and f2 
are selected in such a way that the area of the CCD matches the size of SLM1 and SLM2. 
Finally, the encrypted signal is recorded by the CCD placed at a distance d2 from the back 
focal plane of lens L2. Accordingly, the vector cypher-text T is described as 
 
[ ] [ ]
( )( ) ( )( )
1 0 1 2 2 2
0 0 2 2
Pr Pr , , Pr ,
exp , exp , ,
x x y y x yT T M t M d d M d
M i x y M C i x yφ φ
 = + = + 
= =
T e e e e 
 (1) 
where φ0, φ2 are uniformly distributed random variables in the interval [-π, π] and C is a 
constant related with the amount of light reaching SLM2. Distribution M1 is an amplitude 
encryption key in the range [ε,1] with ε >0, Pr[ ] stands for the propagation operator in 
Fresnel diffraction conditions; and vectors ex and ey are unit vectors in the x- and y- 
directions. Tx = |Tx| exp(iτx) and Ty = |Ty| exp(iτy) are the propagated fields in the first and 
second arms of the interferometer respectively. Note that since Tx and Ty are orthogonal 
complex valued distributions, the wave-front T is non-uniformly polarized. Moreover, no 
interference has to be detected at the CCD plane due to the orthogonality of Tx and Ty. 
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Fig. 1. sketch of the optical setup. 
Taking into account the vector character of T it is possible to extract amplitude and phase 
information using polarimetric techniques. Polarization analysis is carried out by placing a 
linear polarizer (LP) and a quarter-wave plate (QWP) when required in front of the CCD 
camera. Stokes images provide a complete description of the state of polarization in each 
point of the wave-front. A set of six polarimetric images (I(0°, 0), I(90°, 0), I(45°, 0), I(135°, 
0), I(45°, π/2) and I(135°, π/2)) have to be recorded for calculating the four Stokes 
distributions (S0, S1, S2, S3) [34]: 
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2
3
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I(α, 0) stands for the recorded intensity when the linear polarizer is set at an angle α with 
respect to the x direction whereas I(α, π/2) is the image recorded when a quarter wave-plate is 
used in addition to the polarizer. The Stokes parameters associated to vector cypher-text T are 
used to recover amplitudes |Tx| and |Ty|, and the phase difference τy -τx. The formulae that 
relate the polarization ellipse parameters with the Stokes vector (S0, S1, S2, S3) are: 
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or equivalently, 
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After encryption, encoded distribution |Tx| exp(i(τy -τx)) is sent through a secure channel. The 
original plain-text t can be retrieved if and only if keys M1 and M2, and distances d1 and d2 are 
known. Notice that M1−1 is well posed since M1 ≠ 0 at any point thus inversion is possible: 
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 (5) 
If a system works in low light illumination conditions, irradiance is recorded according to 
the photon-counting model. It is assumed that, in these conditions the image is statistically 
modeled by the Poisson distribution [35]. According to this law, the probability that no 
photon reaches pixel (xi,yi) is 
 ( )( ) ( )( )0; , exp , ,i i p i iP x y n x y= −  (6) 
where np(xi,yi), is the normalized irradiance at pixel (xi, yi): 
 ( ) ( )
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NP is the predetermined number of photon counts in the entire scene and NxM is the total 
number of pixels. The photon-counting version |Tx|ph of irradiance |Tx| is obtained according to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )0, if rand , P 0; ,,
1, otherwise
ph i i i i
x i i
x y x y
T x y
 ≤
= 
    
 
                             
 (8) 
where rand(xi,yi) is a uniformly distributed random number within the range [0,1]. In order to 
enhance security, photon-counting cypher-text |Tx|ph exp(i(τy -τx)) is transmitted instead of 
using |Tx| exp(i(τy -τx)). Following Eq. (5), an authorized user with access to keys M1 and M2, 
and distances d1 and d2 can retrieve the photon-counting plain-text tph: 
 [ ] 132 2 2 1 1
2
= Pr Pr exp arg Pr , arc tan , , - .phph x
S
t T i M d d M d
S
−
      − −            
  (9) 
Finally, to determine whether tph contains information related with plain text t or not, the 
non-linear cross-correlation tph⊗t is calculated: 
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Indexes k and l are selected in such ways that provide a good discrimination capability with a 
high peak-to-correlation energy [24, 36, 37]. 
3. Numerical test 
To illustrate the encryption process a digital simulation is presented. A 1951 USAF glass 
slide resolution test is used as a true plain-text t (Fig. 2(a)). For convenience we used the 
same resolution test but rotated 90° as the false-class image f (Fig. 2(b)). Inputs images t and f 
are phase encoded with M0. The simulation of the encryption and decryption processes is 
carried out using λ = 520 nm, d1 = 250 mm and d2 = 45 mm; and setting the size of the 
window to 10 mm. To prevent numerical problems in deriving the calculation of M1−1, the 
minimum value of this key is set to ε = 0.2. 
 
Fig. 2. (a) plain-text image t. (b) false-class plain text image f. 
. 
 
Fig. 3. Vector cypher-text (T): (a) Stokes parameter S0 = |(T)|2. Green and red ellipses indicate 
right-handed left-handed polarization respectively. (b) Histogram of |(T)|2. 
Vector cypher-text T = |Tx| exp(iτx) ex + |Ty| exp(iτy) ey is the combination of two 
uncorrelated random complex signals in the x- and y- directions (see Eq. (1)). The Stokes 
parameter S0, |T|2 = |Tx|2 + |Ty|2, is shown in Fig. 3(a). The corresponding histogram exhibits a 
Gamma-like distribution profile as shown in Fig. 3(b). The state of polarization is also 
random since it is described by |Tx|, |Ty| and the phase difference τy -τx. To provide more 
insight about the random nature of both irradiance and polarization, polarization ellipses have 
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been calculated in some points of the recording plane. They appear superimposed in Fig. 3(a); 
green and red ellipses represent right-handed and left-handed polarization respectively 
The other three Stokes parameters are displayed in Fig. 4. These parameters were obtained 
from T and they are also used to retrieve the encoded full complex information |Tx| exp(i(τy -τx)) (see Eq. (4)). 
 
Fig. 4. Stokes parameters (a) S1, (b) S2, (c) S3 displayed using the jet colormap. 
To enhance security, the photon-counting version |Tx|ph of irradiance |Tx| is obtained. |Tx|ph 
is calculated with Np~1% of the number of pixels of the image. An authorized user with 
access to the polarization encryption keys and the correct distances is able to access the 
photon-counting plain-text using Eq. (5) and (9) respectively. Nonlinear correlation indexes 
are estimated calculating the peak-to-correlation energy metric as a function of k and l from 
tph⊗t. The results are shown in Fig. 5(a). Figure 5(b) shows a 3D plot of tph⊗t; note that the 
presence of a sharp peak indicates that verification has been successful. A second numerical 
test is carried out using a false-class input image f (Fig. 2(b)). In this case, the photon-
counting plaintext fph was obtained in the same conditions as in the previous case. 
Nevertheless, correlation fph⊗t does not show a peak so the image is labeled as fake (Fig. 
5(c)). 
4. Optical implementation 
In this section we present an optical experiment to illustrate how the system works in real 
conditions. The encryption procedure is carried out by means of the polarized-based optical 
system sketched in Fig. 1. Design variables are summarized in Table 1. The SLMs used are 
two Holoeye HEO-0017 translucent displays whereas the camera is an AVT Stingray F-080B. 
The light source is a 15 mW green laser diode λ = 520 nm. Note that the size of the beams is 
limited by the frame of the collimating and imaging lenses. 
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 Fig. 5. (a) Nonlinear indexes estimation: Peak to correlation energy as a function of k and l. (b) 
true image (k = 0.1 and l = 0.7); (c) false image (k = 0.1 and l = 0.7). 
Table 1. Values of the variables used in the optical implementation 
Wavelength λ = 520 nm
Propagation distances d1 = 250 mm and d2 = 45 mm 
Focal lengths f1 = 200 mm and f2 = 60 mm 
M1 minimum value ε = 0.2
SLM  
Pixel pitch 0.036 mm
Resolution (# of pixels) 1024 x 768 pixels
Diameter of the beam / encryption key 10 mm
CCD  
Pixel pitch 0.00465 mm
Resolution (# of pixels) 1032 x 776 pixels
Diameter of the encrypted signal 3 mm
Np (number of photons) 
Without phase mask M0 
With phase mask M0 
Np = 3000 (about 1%) 
Np = 9000 (about 3%) 
 
In section 2, masks M1 and M2 were designed as amplitude-only and phase only 
distributions. Nevertheless, in our experiment, the displays operate in phase mostly and high-
contrast configurations (see Fig. 6); in both cases, a strong amplitude-phase coupling is 
obtained. For the case of display 1, the resulting M’1 mask is no longer real because the 
effective modulation curve encodes the mask. The same happens with mask M2 since key M’2 
is also complex valued. Despite the fact that modulation encoding is a continuous and smooth 
deterministic procedure, this step introduces a nonlinear change on the encryption keys. 
Consequently, modulation curves have to be known in advantage in order to allow fully 
reconstruction of the plain-text. 
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 Fig. 6. SLM modulation polar plot: (a) SLM1: high-contrast configuration; (b) SLM2: phase-
mostly configuration. 
Precise alignment between the corresponding pixels of the two SLMs is required in order 
to achieve a correct encryption signal. The tuning procedure is carried out by displaying the 
same test pattern on both SLMs (Fig. 7(a)) and subsequently imaging them on the CCD (Fig. 
7(b)). Note that both images are polarized in orthogonal directions and no interference is 
detected. Then, one of the images is electronically shifted until both distributions coincide 
(Fig. 7(c)). If required, final fine tuning is accomplished by displacing slightly one of the 
displays using a XY motorized stage. 
 
Fig. 7. Alignment procedure: (a) test pattern; (b) Misaligned patterns; (c) aligned patterns. 
Then, images t and f (Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)) are encrypted. In this first test, but without loss 
of generality, the phase mask M0 is not used. For illustration purposes, the experimental 
Stokes parameters of the encrypted signal T for the true-class image t are shown in Figs. 8(a)-
8(d). 
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 Fig. 8. Stokes parameters (a) S0 = |(T)|2, (b) S1, (c) S2, (d) S3. 
Using the Stokes images, and by means of Eqs. (4) and (5), phase τ’x and amplitude |Tx| 
are determined. Then, a photon limited distribution |Tx|ph with N = 3200 photons (about 1% of 
the total number of used pixels on the CCD) is generated. Both true-class image t and false-
class image f photon-limited distributions are generated (see Figs. 9(a) and 9(b)). 
 
Fig. 9. Photon counting encrypted signals N = 3200 (about 1% of the total encrypted signal): 
(a) true class tph; (b) false class fph. 
Using Eq. (9) and the decryption information (keys, distances, and modulation curves), 
photon-counting plain-text texts tph and fph are calculated. The nonlinear cross-correlations 
tph⊗t and fph⊗t are obtained using Eq. (10) as shown in Fig. 10. The sharp peak present in 
tph⊗t validates t whereas f is rejected because of the low correlation signal in fph⊗t. 
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 Fig. 10. Photon counting encrypted nonlinear cross-correlation. Indexes used k = 0.1 and l = 
0.7: (a) true class: tph⊗t (b) false class: f ph⊗t. 
We repeated the experiment but now the plain text t and the false class f images are phase-
encoded using a cello tape diffusor. The number of photons used is slightly higher, Np = 9500 
(around a 3% of the total number of used pixels on the CCD). Note that when the image is 
phase encoded, the propagated signal is a random pattern described by a Gamma probability 
distribution [38,39]. This fact produces a stronger encryption signal but more photons are 
required in |Tx|ph for obtaining good correlations outputs. Using the appropriate decryption 
information, photon-counting plaintexts are retrieved. The corresponding nonlinear cross-
correlations tph⊗t and fph⊗t are shown in Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) respectively. Despite the fact 
that correlations are noisier, the true-class image is validated as shown in Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 11. Phase-encoded photon counting encrypted nonlinear cross-correlation. Indexes used k 
= 0.1 and l = 0.7: (a) true class: tph⊗t (b) false class: f ph⊗t. 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have developed a polarimetric-based optical encoder setup for image encryption and 
verification purposes based on a Mach-Zehnder interferometer combined with translucent 
spatial light modulators. Stokes parameters information is used for retrieving full complex 
information of the encrypted vector beam. Moreover, security can be enhanced by recording 
the encrypted polarized signal under low-light illumination conditions using the photon-
counting model. The addition of photon-counting model in the encryption process provides 
sparseness of recorded data and nonlinear transformation to enhance security. Provided that 
polarization keys and optical design variables are known, an authorized user can retrieve and 
validate the photon-counting plain-text. The experiments carried out demonstrate the 
feasibility of using such system as a polarimetric optical encoder for security applications. 
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Since we are using an interferometric system in the implementation of encryption process, our 
approach can be extended to encrypting 3D objects [40]. 
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